This study analyses the development of a tobacco-control agenda in Brazil 
Introduction
Between the early 1990s and the first years of the 21 st century, the prevalence of smoking decreased 35% on average in Brazil, dropping from 34.8% to a countrywide average of 22.4% 1 . This fall was particularly related to strong action of healthcare-related players in prevention programs and the establishment of a tobacco restrictive legislation 2 .
This process allowed that, when the World Health Organization (WHO) started the development of an international treaty on Public Health addressing global tobacco control, in 1999, Brazil became a leading country in the process of clause negotiations. The so-called Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO-FCTC) was approved by a consensus of the WHO member countries in 2003, Brazil being the second signatory to adhere to the initial version of the treaty 2, 3, 4, 5 .
Notwithstanding Brazil's highlighted stand in the treaty development process, discussions for its ratification by National Congress, with ensuing entry in the Executive and Legislative politicaldecision agenda, were marked by prolonged controversies involving different players, including tobacco industry advocates, tobacco farmers, tobacco-control non-governmental organizations, public health experts and politicians. Only after two years of discussions, when the term for adhesion to the treaty was about to expire and Brazil was in risk of not participating in the first Meeting of the Parties session, WHO-FCTC would be ratified by Congress; hence, Brazil was the 100 th country to sign the Convention 3, 4, 5 .
This paper discusses the transformation of tobacco-control actions into a State policy -characterized by the final adhesion of the country to WHO-FCTC -taking Kingdon's Multiple Streams Approach into consideration 6 . For this author, the formulation of public policies is made from a set of processes, including configuration of the agenda, specification of alternatives from which one option will be chosen; the choosing of one alternative by legislative voting or executive decision, and the implementation of the decision. The "planning" will depend on the way ongoing problems appear in the system, which will contribute to the design of the agenda, to the process of knowledge accumulation on the issues at stake, to the perspective of experts, and to the political process, which includes domestic mood swings, public opinion and the results of elections 6 . Three families of processes are involved in the development of the agenda: the problems; the alternatives, and actions to face them (policies); and the set of activities related to power relationships and authority (politics). The process leading to the opening of a 'window of political opportunity" comes from the confluence of these three agenda composition streams. In the situation under assessment, the window of opportunity was the WHO-FCTC scrutiny by the Brazilian Congress, when players and stakeholders involved with the issue operated for their demands to be included.
In accordance with Kingdon's perspective, we claim that the process involving Brazilian participation in the WHO-FCTC -from its leading role in the preparation of the document until its approval by the Federal Senate -gave rise to a flow of problems related to tobacco control in the political agenda, which was already being tackled by the health system bureaucracy in other instances. 
Politics stream: feasibility and solutions
During the 1990s, the Brazilian state established a broad array of tobacco-control measures based on the ongoing development of a tobacco-restraining legislation and the development of domestic expertise regarding the control of the disease 2, 7 .
With the regulation of the Brazilian Unified National Health System (SUS), in 1990 by Law 8,080, on August 19, the mandate for tobacco control actions was assigned to the Brazilian National Cancer
Cad. Saúde Pública 2017; 33 Sup 3:e00121016 Institut (INCA), which took over and revitalized the existing National Tobacco Control Program (PNTC). PNCT gathered health education and advocacy actions carried out particularly with medical societies, representatives of the Legislative and Executive, the academia and non-governmental organizations. INCA soon became the national reference for the development of actions and knowledge on tobacco control 2 .
The Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (Anvisa) was another body with strong influence on tobacco control. Established in 1999, it organized the registration of tobacco products traded in Brazil, defined the maximum amounts of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide for cigarettes; regulated the advertisement of these products and established the mandatory printing of warning images for smokers on cigarette packs. Having the mandate to regulate tobacco products, Anvisa played a major role in putting into effect the tobacco-control policies in that period 2, 7 .
Even though Brazil was the second largest tobacco producer, and the largest exporter of tobacco leaves in the world at that time, the characteristics of the PNCT, tobacco control legislation and the regulatory role of Anvisa made Brazil a world reference on tobacco control measures. One can thus infer that healthcare players had a significant role in the development of conditions for the construction of policies that led Brazil to play a main role in WHO-FCTC arrangements and its ensuing ratification by the Congress 6 .
Notwithstanding, another player was instrumental to the leading role played by Brazil in the early steps of the treaty: Brazilian diplomacy. In regards to foreign policy, since the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , Brazil had been valuing the development of South-South strategic coalitions. However, only during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) would this unfold in a practical agenda of more organized actions and policies 8 . Particularly under the guidance of Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , the idea that Brazil could occupy a more prestigious position in the international setting, being a global player, by having a discourse and policies in regards to actions of peace, and international support and cooperation on education and healthcare actions (softpower) would become more institutionally nurtured.
In this scenario, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health took steps towards a more significant global role, enhancing initiatives with African and Mercosur countries, and with multilateral agencies such as WHO. Under the perspective of foreign affairs, the initiatives developed by the Ministry of Health were aligned to the guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy. The role played by Brazil in the discussions and resolutions dealing with protection and flexibility of proprietary rights on pharmaceutical products and its consequences in public health, in 1994, and the signing of a protocol of intentions to formalize collaboration actions between the Ministries of Health and Foreign Affairs, in 2005, are examples of this process 9 .
Thus, at a time when global players such as WHO, faced the challenge of tackling the tobacco problem, Brazil already had players and institutional expertise of high levels, making the country able to play a leading position in the development of a global anti-tobacco treaty. Furthermore, in a synergistic movement, Brazilian diplomacy, represented in particular by diplomat Celso Amorim, gained more strength and legitimacy in its actions, supported by alliances and international partnerships favored by Brazilian foreign policy.
The flow of problems and focal events
The development of WHO-FCTC came as a consequence of a proposition for international mobilization towards tobacco control, made in the 48 th World Health Assembly, in 1995 4 . Its development is also related to the acknowledgement by the international scientific community that smoking causes a number of diseases, and worsens hunger and poverty around the world. It can also be seen as a reaction against the global increase of tobacco consumption, enhanced by the tobacco industry strategy of transferring cigarette manufacturing and most of the consumption-targeted initiatives to the less regulated markets of developing countries 2 in the preliminary negotiations of the treaty resulted in the appointment of the Brazilian delegate, ambassador Celso Amorim, to be appointed INB Chair 2,3,4 .
The final version of the treaty was approved at the 56 th World Health Assembly, in May 2003, and included provisions for the implementation of tax policies aiming at consumption reduction; protection against tobacco smoke exposure; regulations on the dissemination of tobacco product information, packaging regulations; printing of health warnings on the packs; the development of education and awareness-raising programs on tobacco hazards; advertisement prohibition; and the implementation of nicotine addiction treatment programs. To reduce the supply of tobacco products, the treaty also addressed the control of smuggling; restrictions to tobacco production and manufacturing subsidies; gradual replacement of tobacco farming and support to economically feasible activities to tobacco farmers 10 .
In this scenario, the Federal administration, sailing in an environment favorable to the Convention, established, through Decree 3,136, issued on August 13, 1999 11 
The WHO-FCTC ratification process: political flow, agendas and alternatives
According with the multiple flow theory used in this analysis, the players involved in a process are decisive to place the issue in the governmental agenda, and in the development of alternatives for its effectiveness. Hence, health professionals were responsible for tobacco consumption to be considered a public health problem. Then, the diplomats worked on the development of an international agenda on the issue. These key players are responsible for including this issue among the concerns of the government, making new groups of players emerge, whether in favor or against the development of tobacco-control specific public policies, particularly NGOs, medical associations and associations of agricultural farmers and tobacco growers -anti-and pro-tobacco advocates -and politicians and high governmental officials 6 .
In the group of health professionals mention should be made to the National Cancer Institute experts and the PNTC staff. The former achieved international recognition among tobacco-control organizations. Vera Luíza da Costa e Silva, for instance, who worked at INCA between 1994 and 2000, in 2001 became the head to WHO's Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI), the main tobacco-control organization in the world 3, 4 . At the frontline of the disputes, the staff of the PNCT was highly important in the public hearings held during the examination of the project in the Senate. According to Rangel, a network of city and state coordinators of the Program was formed, working in accordance with the guidelines set by the Program's city and state managers for the passing of the project 5 .
In congress there were opposing stands. On one hand, congressmen who defended the interests of tobacco farmers and the industry; on the other, those who made efforts to approve the WHO-FCTC. 14 . This advocacy group, even with no formal position within the government, worked as a political force -hidden clusters of participants, according to Kingdon -meaning that, despite being "hidden", the group was responsible for generating ideas and paradigms and putting them in discussion 6 .
On the other end of the line of interests, sectors connected to the tobacco-producing chain also acted as advocates, and also had their "hidden participants" playing an important role, particularly the cigarette industry. It was represented by organizations such as the Brazilian Association of Tabacco Farmers (Associação de Fumicultores do Brasil -Afubra), the Tobacco Industry Union (Sindicato da Indús-tria do Fumo -SINDIFUMO), and the Brazilian Association of Tobacco Industry (Associação Brasileira da Indústria do Fumo -ABIFUMO). In this group, Afubra -an entity considered by tobacco-control organizations as a front established to defend the interests of the tobacco industry 13 Initially, healthcare players thought that the issue was seen under favorable eyes, and approval was sure. They expected WHO-FCTC to be rapidly ratified by Congress, considering that Brazil was internationally acknowledged in terms of tobacco control policies, had chaired the negotiations about the wording of the treaty, and was the second country to have signed it 3, 5 . However, in the Southern region of the country, with 90% of the tobacco output, the ratification opened a window of opportunities for representatives of the tobacco producing chain, who were attentive to the examination of the issue by the Congress and developed their own agenda, to which part of tobacco farmers who were against the ratification adhered.
In The hearing started with a presentation by the Minister of Health on the importance of approving the Framework Convention, in which he provided different pieces of data on the hazards of smoking, the strategies of the tobacco industry, and the national tobacco control program. The Minister emphasized the aspects he knew tobacco producers would give him a hard time about, particularly WHO-FCTC article 17, which addressed the promotion of alternative activities to tobacco planting.
Costa tried to show that the treaty did not forbid tobacco growing; on the contrary, it tried to provide government support for alternative activities to tobacco growing that were economically feasible. He also highlighted that only by ratifying the treaty could Brazil take part in the Conference of the Parties, where negotiations about the treaty protocols would take place, hence discussions about technical and financial support alternatives which directly interested the planters 16 .
Treaty advocates included Margareth Matos, Distric Attorney, DA Office of the State of Paraná; Nise Yamaguchi, President, São Paulo Association of Clinical Oncology; and Tânia Cavalcante, Head, Tobacco Division, National Cancer Institute. Overall, their speeches reinforced the arguments presented by the Health Minister, with Margareth Matos emphasizing the environmental problems the farming system caused 16 .
The representatives of the tobacco productive chain who attended the hearing were the presidents of the Federation of Agricultural Workers of Rio Grande do Sul (FETAG); the Agricultural Federation of Rio Grande do Sul (FARSUL); the Federation of Agricultural Workers of Santa Catarina (FETAESC); the Federation of the Municipalities Association of Rio Grande do Sul (FAMURS); the Agricultural Federation of the State of Santa Catarina (FAESC); and the Afubra. In their speeches, they presented data about the economic relevance of tobacco, they criticized the haste to approve the Convention, and asked the government for assurances regarding the maintenance of tobacco crops, reinforcing its economic importance for the country and, in particular, for families whose livelihoods come from its farming 16 .
In the subsequent hearings, the economic importance of tobacco was once again reinforced by representatives of the tobacco chain. They revisited the arguments regarding the future of tobacco farmers and the economy of the region. Therefore, the issue of alternative crops to tobacco, established in article 17 of the treaty was raised again and again 10 . Afubra, as previously mentioned, was adamantly against the ratification of the WHO-FCTC. Its president claimed it should only be approved once the guidelines for alternative crops were defined: ensuring price and markets, selection of other crops to replace tobacco, the source and the amount of resources for this conversion, etc. 15 .
The organizations representing tobacco growers presented an array of reasons in the hearings. The MPA had a more flexible stand regarding the ratification of the Convention, endorsing the arguments of both health professionals and tobacco growers. Its coordinator stated that the tobacco farmer was the weakest link of the tobacco productive chain, as they generated huge profits for the industry, expanding their cultivated areas, but gained less with their work. He also proposed that discussions about the WHO-FCTC also be held in producing regions, so that the farmers could be informed about the stand of the Ministry of Health and understand government intentions. This request was seconded by tobacco growers representatives 3, 15 .
Outside the hearings, in December 2004, FETRAF-SUL -an organization connected to the Workers CUT that gathered rural workers unions of cities in the states of Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina -came to support WHO-FCTC ratification 17 . By understanding that the treaty did not mention any prohibition or limitation to government loans or subsidies to tobacco farming, that organization voiced its support for treaty ratification shortly after the second public hearing; it was Cad. Saúde Pública 2017; 33 Sup 3:e00121016 the first farmers representative organization to support ratification. From then on, FETRAF-SUL started to take part in the events on tobacco farming, with a compromising stand with the interests of the government 3 .
There was no unanimous stand among those that criticized the WHO-FCTC. Positions ranged from groups being utterly against and reactive to the treaty to segments that accepted, if not the treaty as a whole, at least parts of it.
In March 2005, the Senate's Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee sent the matter for analysis by the Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Committee. On May 31 st , World No-Tobacco Day, the issue was discussed in a meeting between the President of the Senate, Renan Calheiros, the Minister of Health and representatives of different entities and NGOs, who asked for a speedy approval 18 . At that time, a petition signed by 24,000 people supporting ratification of the treaty was presented to the President of the Senate. Senators Tião Viana (PT-AC) and Aloizio Mercadante (PT-SP) were also present in the meeting and showed sympathy to the cause. The concern with those in favor of the WHO-FCTC was that the ratified treaty should be delivered to WHO until November 2005, so that Brazil could take part in the first WHO-FCTC Meeting of the Parties. In the following month, tobacco farmer representatives were also received by the President of the Senate, and presented a petition signed by more than 195,000 people against ratification. Senators Pedro Simon (PMDB-RS), Paulo Paim (PT-RS) and Sérgio Zambiasi (PTB-RS) escorted the group. Senate President Renan Calheiros said that decision on the matter would be make only when discussions made all parties clear on what was at stake 18 .
Between August and October 2005, the Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Committee held four other public hearings in cities of tobacco farming areas 15 . Discussions remained polarized between groups in favor and against WHO-FCTC ratification. Those in favor of ratification in addition to health-related arguments, emphasized that nowhere in the Convention was it established that tobacco planting should be eradicated. On the contrary, the Convention proposed the development of institutional tools that ensured subsidies to alternative crops to tobacco. Those against the treaty claimed that first the alternative crops should be in place, and only after the ratification process should be initiated.
The significant presence of tobacco farmers in the hearings mobilized politicians from the farming areas, whether in Congress, or in producing city and state governments. They were all against the treaty. In the opposing front, the Ministry of Health gained support from the governments of the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina, who were in favor of the ratification in the hearings held in Irati and Florianópolis. However, government representatives of the state of Rio Grande do Sul were adamant against treaty ratification.
More than 4,000 tobacco farmers attended the hearing held on September 23, 2005, in the city of Camaquã, Rio Grande do Sul 19 , and discussions were fierce. The representative of the governor, Erico Feltrin, highlighted the importance for tobacco farmers of treaty approval considering that it proposed planting new crops as an alternative to tobacco, and the lack of indication that tobacco should be eradicated. Representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Agrarian Development also spoke, and reinforced those arguments. Representatives of the NGO Zero Tobacco Network, FETRAF-SUL and the INCA also spoke in favor of the treaty.
The mobilization of those in favor of the Convention was essential in the final stage of the process. The manifestations promoted by these groups attracted the attention of the media, giving the necessary weight to the issue, which decisively influenced the approval of the bill 3 . In September 2005, a mobilization was organized in Brasília by organizations such as the NGO Tobacco Zero Network and the São Paulo Society of Clinical Oncology. They disclosed the names of Senators who were against ratification, in order to pressure them 20 . In October, treaty advocates visited the offices of Senators and, once again, pressured the Senate President for a swift approval of the bill 21 .
On October 27, 2005, following a request for urgent voting presented by Senator Tião Viana, the bill was brought to the floor, and the favorable reports made by the Committees of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, and Social Issues were read.
During the discussion of the bill in the Senate, rapporteur Heráclito Fortes informed he had received an official note from the Chief of Staff, Dilma Roussef, informing the stand of the Federal Government on the issue. That document was signed by six Ministers, and presented the reasons for
Cad. Saúde Pública 2017; 33 Sup 3:e00121016 treaty ratification and proposals, in order to appease tobacco farmers and encourage the decision for ratification. The first proposal was that, at the time of ratification, a statement with the interpretation of specific clauses of the treaty be issued, a sort of safeguard to avoid commitments that could somehow be detrimental to Brazil. The second proposition was the launching of the Program to Support Diversification of Tobacco Farming Areas, with four strategic pillars: funding, technology access, value added to local output, and trading assurance. The Program was detailed in the statement 22 .
The statement prompted a favorable opinion of the rapporteur. After his report was presented, discussion ensued and ratification was consensual, thirteen days prior to the deadline for the Brazil to take part in the first WHO-FCTC Conference of the Parties. Treaty ratification was through Legislative Decree 1,012, of October 28, 2005. Brazil was the 100 th country to ratify the WHO-FCTC 3 .
Conclusion
According to Kingdon's theory, a window of opportunity can only be opened when the flow of problems, policies and politics are aligned 6 . In this case, the flow of problems consisted in classifying tobacco output, trade and use as a public health issue. In regards to flow of policies, there is intense and successful work by health-related players to develop tobacco-control public policies and actions. From movements abroad this flow won an important ally -the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -which enhances and reinforces the negotiations, leading Brazil to a position of prominence within the WHO-FCTC scope. Subsequently, political events take place, particularly in partisan politics or political flow, that finally allow WHO-FCTC to be included in the national legislation. Worthy of note is that there were complex and synergistic policies and political relations in both domestic and international settings.
In regards to the international setting, we saw that early in the 21 st century different global players, such as the United Nations, WHO, and part of the health-related international scientific community joined efforts towards the establishment of a tobacco-control treaty. In the domestic setting, the leadership of Brazilian diplomacy in the development of the WHO-FCTC gave rise to a tobacco-related political agenda and flow of problems which were, to some extent, being considered by healthcare players in Brazil but, since then, with international legitimacy, positively reflected on future actions of these players. In other words, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs combined with that of healthcare players made possible the development and also the ratification of the WHO-FCTC as a public policy in the domestic setting.
WHO-FCTC entry in the Brazilian legislation also indicates a complex, non-linear course in the development of anti-tobacco policies in Brazil and its discussions in Congress. It included players with different, but at times converging interests -such as those of the healthcare area and diplomacy -, the discussions followed a political flow typical of democracies. Contrary to swift decisions that are often connected to technical-based processes, the discussions about the WHO-FCTC were extensive, even in terms of territoriality, and included marginal decision-making players, which made this process more complex, as it encompassed a broader and more representative political base of the political forces associated with the issue at stake. 
